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Abstract
Despite  massive oil rent incomes since the early 1970s,  and the danger of oil-led spending and expenditure
the economic performance  of oil-exporting  countries-  commitments becoming the major legitimizing  force
with notable exceptions-is poor. While there  is  behind  the state may  pose risk to the long-term
extensive  literature  on the management  of oil  resources,  sustainability of their current development strategies.  In
analysis of the underlying political determinants  of this  contrast, little positive effect can be  expected  from the
poor performance  is more  sparse. Drawing  on concepts  politically  unstable,  predatory autocracies,  which
from the comparative  institutionalist  tradition in political  typically have very short policy horizons and sometimes
science,  Eifert,  Gelb, and Tallroth develop a generalized  the characteristics  of "roving bandit" regimes.  Factional
typology of political  states that is used in analyzing the  democracies,  with weak political parties  and highly
political  economy of fiscal and  economic management  in  personalized  politics, present particular challenges
oil-exporting countries  with widely differing  political  because they  lack a sufficiently effective  political system
systems.  In assessing performance,  the authors focus on  to create a consensus among strong competing interests.
issues of long-term savings,  economic stabilization,  and  Special attention  will be needed  to increase transparency
efficient use of oil rents.  and raise public awareness in these countries.  And oil
The comparisons  of country experiences  suggest that  rent makes it more difficult to sustain  a constituency  in
countries  with strong, mature, democratic  traditions  have  favor of sound, longer-run  economic management
advantages  in managing oil rents well because of their  because it weakens  incentives  for agents to support
ability to reach consensus,  their educated  and informed  checks and  balances that impinge  on their individual
electorates,  and a high level of transparency that  plans to appropriate  the rents.  The country comparisons
facilitates  clear decisions on how to use rents  over a long  further demonstrate  that technical solutions-such  as the
horizon. Yet even these systems,  ensuring cautious use of  establishment  of oil stabilization funds and budgetary
oil income  is a continuing  struggle. Traditional  and  reforms-to  enhance  transparency  and efficiency  in  the
modernizing  autocracies  have also demonstrated  their  use of oil rents will not work well unless constituencies
ability to sustain  long decision  horizons and implement  can be developed in support of such measures.
developmental  policies.  But resistance to transparency
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1. Introduction
Most mineral  exporters,  and in particular  the oil exporters,  have done  far less well  than
resource-poor  countries  over  the  past  few  decades,  particularly  when  considering  the
massive revenue gains to the oil exporting countries since  1973. Many studies support the
"paradox of plenty" (recent examples  include Auty, 2001,  and Gylfason, 2000 and 2001),
even  though  there  are  certainly  exceptions  to  this  pattern.  Some  of the  high-income
OECD  countries  are  resource-abundant,  Botswana  stands  out  as  a  successful  mineral
exporter,  and Malaysia has grown  and diversified  away from resource-based  production,
including  oil.  But  why  has  the  overall  record  of  oil  exporting  countries  been  so
disappointing?
This paper considers  the  political  economy  of fiscal policy and  economic  management
across oil  exporting  countries  with widely  differing  political  systems.  Politics  affects
economics  -- how oil rents  are collected,  allocated and used, including often to sustain a
poor policy regime (Auty,  2001).  But oil affects politics also -- a large, concentrated rent
source  in national  income  can mould the social  and political  institutions  of a producing
country,  into  what  some  have  termed  the  "rentier  state"(Karl,  1999).  3  Technical
approaches  to  managing  rents  therefore  need  to  be  seen  in  a  political  context,  and
implemented  in  parallel  with  approaches  to  strengthen  the  constituencies  needed  to
support them.
In comparing the performance  of oil  exporting  countries, the  paper  attempts  to identify
factors that have helped them to manage rents well.  Some caveats  are in order.  Political
categories  are not robust enough  to provide  a clear political-economy  linkage.  Political
regimes  also change,  sometimes  sharply,  but at the  same time  existing  institutions may
reflect the impact of years of previous political regimes,  in addition to the impact of the
current  one.  While  there  is  a  large  literature  on  the  management  of  oil  resources,
comparative  analysis of the  underlying  political  determinants  of policy is more  sparse.
The  paper  is  therefore  more  suggestive  than  definitive.  It  also  focuses  on  spending,
rather than revenue policies, not because the latter are uninteresting but because  most of
'Stanford  University and World Bank.  Paper prepared  for IMF Conference on Fiscal Policy Formulation
and  Implementation  in  Oil  Producing  Countries,  June  5-6,  2002.  The views  expressed  in this paper are
those  of the authors  and  should not be  attributed  to the World  Bank or to its Executive  Directors  or the
countries that they represent.
2 The authors  would  like to thank  Ms. Xiao Ye  and  other colleagues  who have provided  material for this
paper as  well as the discussants  and other  participants  in the conference  who provided  useful  comments.
Responsibility for errors is that of the authors alone.
3  Another strain of research considers the role of natural rent in encouraging civil conflict in countries such
as Angola, the Democratic  Republic of Congo,  Liberia, and Sierra Leone.  See for example Collier and
Hoeffler (2002) and Tallroth (1997).2
the problems  of economic  management relate to the use of revenues  rather than to their
collection.
The following section sets out some general principles for managing oil rents well, based
on the experience of exporters over the last three decades.  Section 3 presents an extended
version of Lal's (1995) topology of political  states, which is used in Section 4 to discuss
selected oil producers.  Section 5 concludes with suggestions for ways to encourage  good
practice in managing oil rents.
2.  Managing Oil Revenues
Most of the  essentials  for managing  oil  revenues  well  are  the  same as  those  for  good
budget  management  in general,  but  some  issues  are  more  important  for  oil  exporters.
These  include  how  much  to  save  for  future  generations,  how  to  deal  with  uncertain
revenues  and  avoid  "boom-bust"  cycles,  and  how  to  ensure  that  spending  is  of high
quality,  whether  in  the  form  of  large  investment  projects,  public  consumption  or
subsidies.
Saving.  Whether countries should save or borrow against anticipated future oil income to
fund  current  consumption  and  investment  (as  Mexico  did  in  1979)  depends  on  the
projected  profiles  of oil output,  extraction  costs,  prices,  discount  rates  and  returns  on
alternative  investments  to  keeping  oil  in  the  ground.  These  are  slippery  numbers.
Proven  reserves  are  far  larger  today  than  three  decades  ago.  New  technology  has
widened the range of  oil  substitutes,  including tar sands and coal gasification  which are
now economic  at oil  prices  of $15  - 20 per barrel.  New liberal  pricing regimes  have
stimulated production  (Mommer  1999),  as has  the opening of the  former  Soviet  Union.
On the other hand,  the share  of natural rent in the price of oil will probably fall as low-
cost  fields  are  depleted,  and  in  some  countries  rent  will  fall  further  relative  to
development  needs  due  to  high  population  growth.  Optimal  savings  rates  are  very
sensitive to such assumptions.
Stabilizing.  Oil prices have been highly variable  (Figure  1):  twice  as variable  as those
of other commodities,  even when changes  are measured  as deviation  from recent trends
(Dehn, 2001).  Changes  have also been very poorly predicted, and it has been difficult to
separate  out temporary  fluctuations  from trends.4 If past experience  is  a guide,  shocks
will continue to be poorly foreseen,  and producing countries  will be vulnerable to boom-
bust cycles.  Instability  is very costly,  as economies  and budgets adjust asymmetrically.
On  the upside, growth  increases  little;  on the downside,  output contracts  (Dehn,  2001).
Over  a  series  of cycles,  countries  move  towards  stagflation.  Rapid  growth  in public
spending,  which  often  follows  oil  price  increases,  reduces  spending  quality  and
4  The  1974  and  1979 price  increases  were not foreseen by  consensus  forecasts.  By the  early  1980s,  high
prices  were  widely blamed  on scarcity,  with projections  for  $50 per barrel  or even  higher.  Instead,  the
spike  of the  early  1980s  was  followed  by the  oil slump  arnd  a  sharp  price  decline.  Prices  reached  an
unexpected nadir in  1998 with the  shock of the Asia crisis;  projections  envisaged a slow rebound towards
$20 per barrel but failed to pick up the spike of 2000 to levels 50 percent higher.3
introduces  entitlements,  including  recurrent  cost  commitments,  which  are  often  not
sustainable  in  the  long-run.  Efficiency  often  suffers  from  a  high  proportion  of
unfinished projects  as well  as from capital investments  that cannot  be effectively used
because of shortages of recurrent resources.
Simulations  using  a  computable  general  equilibrium  model  with  a  20  year  horizon
suggests that optimal  savings during revenue booms like those of the 1970s ought to be
60-70 percent of the gains (Gelb,  1988), far higher than the levels achieved by exporters.
They  also  show that  the  costs  of  policies  formulated  on  the  basis  of overoptimistic
projections  of prices  and revenues  during  a windfall  period can amount to  several  times
the potential benefit of the windfall itself (Gelb,  1988).5  It is easy to turn potential gains
into losses. There is therefore a strong case for making cautious  revenue projections,  for
holding  larger  than  normal  reserves,  for  minimizing  outstanding  public  debt  and  for
using hedging  techniques  in order  to  cushion  shocks  and  gain  an additional  margin of
fiscal flexibility.
Using  Rents  Well.  In  almost all  producers,  oil rents  are  seen  as the property  of the
nation.6  The problem is how to articulate this concept in an effective and widely-agreed
way through  the political process.  Lack of clarity  in property  rights  encourages  rent-
seeking  behavior;  mechanisms  to  distribute  rent  should thus  be  clear,  and  be part  of a
transparent  budget process  able  to  link  fiscal  choices  to  current  and  (conservatively)
projected revenues.  For any given level of use, the mix of channels to distribute rents to
citizens,  whether  through  public  investment  or  recurrent  spending,  subsidies  and
transfers,  or lower  non-oil  taxes,  should  reflect  the marginal  value of public  resources
relative to those in private hands.
Within these general  areas, two potential pitfalls tend to be particularly important for oil
exporters.  First,  the concentration  of fiscal resources  tends to encourage  excessive  and
imprudent  investment:  the  state  implements  large  projects  without  sufficient
participation  of private  co-investors  to  provide  a  screen  against  excessive  risk  (Gelb,
1988, Auty,  1999).7  Second,  some ways of distributing rent, whether through  sustained
protection of favored  activities  or firms, or a combination  of non-oil taxes and subsidies
and  public spending,  have high  deadweight  costs  and  encourage  corruption.  In some
cases,  very  low non-oil  taxes  might  be  useful  as  part  of a  rent-distribution  strategy,
though this approach  should be combined with measures to strengthen tax administration
to diversify potential revenue  sources to create a buffer against oil revenue  fluctuations.
Cheap domestic energy could be one element of such a strategy (particularly  in times of
high world  energy  prices),  but needs  to  be viewed  in the  wider  context  of  non-oil
taxation.
5 This conclusion agrees  with the conclusion of a recent study of countries  exposed to  large shocks, which
shows that the losses are typically far larger than the gains (Collier 2002).
6 The United  States is one of the very few  countries where  sub-surface rent conveys with ownership of the
surface  land rights.
7  Small  minority  private  participation  provides  little screening  as  partners  expect  to gain  far  more  from
supplying cost overruns than from profitable projects.4
These prescriptions  are  well  enough  in  theory.  But  they often  confront  the  reality  of.
opaque,  highly  politicized  fiscal  systems  that lack  the  checks  and  balances  needed  to
ensure  that resources  are  well  employed and to  provide the  fiscal  flexibility needed  to
adjust spending in line with changes in resources.  In extreme cases, when the legitimacy
of the  government  comes to rest on the transfer  of oil rent,  no fiscal  adjustment will be
possible  unless  forced  by a crisis.  Rents  weaken  agencies  of restraint.  For any  given
group, they  divert  incentives  away  from  ensuring  efficient  use of resources  across  the
economy  (including  by other groups)  in favor  of  appropriating  rents unencumbered  by
the reciprocal scrutiny of the other groups.  How this plays out in any given country will
depend  on whether  the political  process  is able  to support  a consensus  around  a sound
longer-run  social  and economic  trajectory.  If so,  rents  can provide  exports,  taxes  and
savings to open up additional  degrees  of freedom  for economic  policy.  If not, they  are
likely to fuel a destructive process of competition that is mirrored  in economic crisis and
decline.
3.  The Political Economy  of Rentier States: Towards a Typology
Just as political traditions shape the use of oil rents, rents shape the political economy of
petroleum  exporting nations.  Revenue  streams  from  'black gold'  can finance productive
physical  and social  investment,  or fuel  unsustainable  consumption  booms  and eventual
fiscal  crises;  they  can  improve  public  welfare  through  transparent  distributional
mechanisms,  create  elite  arenas  of competition,  or  underpin kleptocratic  governments.
Karl  (1999)  argues  that  when  petroleum  exploitation  coincides  with  state-building,  it
gives  rise  to  a  self-reinforcing  "legacy  of overly-centralized  political  power,  strong
networks  of complicity  between  public  and  private  sector  actors,  [and]  highly  uneven
mineral-based development  subsidized by oil rents." (Karl  1999)  Karl's conclusions may
be  overly deterministic,  but her  observations ring true  for many  oil  exporting states.  In
this section  we construct a comparative  analytical  framework which offers  insights  into
the  political  economy of oil windfall  management  in  varying  political  and  institutional
contexts.
Political scientists  have offered insights into the state which have implications for rentier
economies.  Mancur  Olson  (1986,  2000)  emphasizes  the  importance  of  horizon
constraints  in  shaping  the  behavior  of governments.  Bates  (2001)  stresses  the  way  in
which  the  relaxation  of  government  budget  constraints  creates  disincentives  for
economically rational behavior  and reform.  Work on the theory of rent-seeking  behavior
illustrates  how  rent reorients  economic  incentives  towards  competing  for  access  from
productive  activities,  especially  in  non-transparent  environments  characterized  by.
political  discretion  and  unclear  property rights.  These  studies  and others  offer insights
which  can  help  build  an  analytical  framework  for  better  understanding  of  and
improvement  in the fiscal and economic  management policies in oil exporting  countries.
Still,  systems of state  classification  developed  by political  scientists  remain  difficult  to
operationalize.  Some  scholars  question  the  utility  of classification  schemes  on  the
grounds  that  individual  country  outcomes  are  tightly context-specific,  and  arise  out of
complex  sociological  interactions  combined  with  leadership  and  other random  factors.8
8 For example, see Haggard  (1990).5
Others,  including  a number of economists,  argue  that observable  variations in political
and  institutional  context have  considerable  predictive power  and are  useful.9 We  side
with the latter, while recognizing the limitations of any analysis.
Oil exporting countries may be classified as belonging to one of five main groups: mature
democracies;  "factional"  democracies; paternalistic  autocracies;  modernizing  autocracies;
and predatory  autocracies.  These groups  reflect qualitative  distinctions in 1) the stability
of the political framework  and of party systems,  2) the degree of social consensus,  3) the
legitimization  of  authority  and  the  means  through  which  governments  (or  aspiring
governments)  obtain  and  maintain  support,  and  4)  the  role  of state  institutions  in
underpinning  markets  and  the  distribution  of rents.  These  political  and  institutional
features  foster  differences  in:  the  length  of political  horizons,  levels  of transparency,
policy  stability  and  quality,  the  political  power  of  the  sectors  producing  non-oil
tradeables,  and the power of interests directly attached to state spending  (Table  1).  Even
though the classifications  may not be exhaustive and some countries may have a blend of
features from different categories, such classification  does provide  some insights into the
policy options available  to governments.  They are  also mirrored  in comparative  ratings
such as those of Freedom House and Transparency International:
Transparency  Political and Civil
and Corruption  *  Rights*
Mature  8.4 (0.7)  1 (0)
Democracies
Factional  3.6 (1.1)  2.8 (0.9)
Democracies
Autocracies  1.5 (0.6)  5.7 (0.7)
*  Mean  and  (standard  deviation)  of Freedom  House  scores  (range  1-7)  and  Transparency  International
scores (range  1-10) for 2001. Sources: www.freedomhouse.org  and www.transparency.org
On  Freedom House's ratings of political  rights  and civil  liberties,  mature  democracies
score  the highest  rating,  factional  democracies  quite  high,  and the  autocracies  near  the
lowest  ratings.  On  Transparency  International's  ratings,  the  mature  democracies  score
high, the factional  democracies  are in the lower half of the samnple  and the oil autocracies
that  are  rated  score  at  the  bottom.  The  ratings  suggest  that  democracy  may  have
advanced  further in the factional  democracies  than transparency,  a potentially  important
asymmetry when considering the use of natural rent.
i)  Mature Democracies
Countries  and  sub-national  units  classified  as mature democracies  are  characterized  by
relatively  stable policies, underpinned by a broad social consensus.  Politics is dominated
by  a  few  parties.  Such  political  stability  encourages  long-horizon  behavior,  as  party
reputation  effects  and economic performance  become  central to competition  for political
9  For examples of state classification frameworks,  see political scientists Andrain (1988), Bratton and van
der Walle (1994), Leftwich (1995), and economists Findlay (1990) and Lal (1995).6
power.  The  resulting  policy  regimes  are  generally  based  on  transparent  information;
property  rights  are  clear  and  a  swing  in  government  rarely  leads  to  sweeping
redistribution.  Bureaucracies  are  competent  and  relatively  insulated;  professional
judicial  systems foster de-personalized  functioning of markets  and reasonable  stabilityin
rules.  State  investment  tends  to  complement,  rather  than  substitute  for,  private
investment;  independent  risk-ratings  are taken  seriously  as  indicating  the prospects  for
investors.  These  features  would  facilitate  the  efficient  use of resources,  including  oil
rents,  and help to contain rent-seeking  behavior.  They also give citizens the opportunity
to  provide  a  critical  counterbalance  against  the  influence  of  interests  attached  to
government spending.  Norway,  the  State of Alaska and the  Province of Alberta can  be
seen as prototype representatives  of this category of states.  Botswana shares many of the
features of the mature democracies,  despite  its lesser level of development. 10
ii) Factional Democracies
Countries  classified  as  factional democracies  have several  features that distinguish them
from  mature democracies.  Income  distribution is unequal and social consensus is elusive.
Political  parties  are  often  weak,  and  formed  around  charismatic  leaders;  military
intervention  in politics  is  not uncommon.  Governments  are often unstable;  where  they
are stable,  single-party dominance underlies  nominally democratic  institutions.  In either
form,  political  support derives from systems of patronage.  The  short-horizon politics of
competition for power and state-allocated  resources  gives rise to unstable policy regimes
and  nontransparent  mechanisms  of rent  distribution,  encouraging  the  development  of
clientelistic  networks  and  rent-seeking  behavior  throughout  state  and  society.
Earmarking  is  pervasive  in  these  systems,  as  politically  powerful  interests  attached
directly  to  state  spending,  such  as  bureaucratic  and  political  elites  (including  local
governments),  public  sector  unions  and  the  military,  tend  to  capture  the  state.  These
predatory  interest  groups  can be  stronger  and more  continuous  than political  parties  or
governments,  and try to lock in their claims on rents.  Without a countervailing  force,  oil
rents  injected  into  the  political  game  tend  to  produce  Terry  Karl's  "petromania":  an
explosion  of inefficient  government  spending,  followed  by  fiscal  and  economic  crisis.
Ecuador,  Venezuela,  Colombia and, to a degree, Mexico  can be seen as representatives of
this category of countries.
iii) Paternalistic Autocracies
Paternalistic  autocracies  include  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait,  and  some  of the  smaller  Gulf
states.  Governments  initially  derive  their legitimacy  through traditional  and  religious
authority,  but in the process  of oil-driven modernization  their legitimacy  also  becomes
attached to the mobilization  of oil  wealth to  prop up public living  standards  (Auty  and
Gelb 2001).  Such governments  can be stable  for extended periods;  they seek consensus
and  have  a  much  longer  horizon  than  many  democratic  governments.  Even  though
conventional politics provides no immediate countervailing  force for fiscal restraint, their
concern  with the longer-run  means  that they may also  be  able to save  when revenue  is
0 Botswana enjoys political rights and civil liberties, has a stable party system and is rated close to the
developed countries  in Transparency  International's ratings.7
plentiful.  However,  the  evolving  role  of state  spending  towards  sustaining  political
support generates rising and downwardly-inflexible  expenditure  commitments,  including
subsidies, high levels  of public  employment  in  low-capacity,  overstaffed  bureaucracies,
and protected,  inefficient  enterprises,  which  in the  long-run will  constrain  the  scope for
investments.  Such commitments  can eventually push such states toward fiscal crisis.
iv)  Reformist Autocracies
Reformist  autocracies  tend  to  have  autonomous,  competent,  and  politically  insulated
technocratic  elites.  Their  legitimacy  rests on their  success  in attacking  poverty  through
productive  investment and economic  growth,  ensuring  a long  horizon in policymaking.
Constrained  by their political mandate to  make real  improvements  in the welfare  of the
poor,  such  states  may  deploy  natural  resource  rents  efficiently  to  promote  economic
diversification  and  growth,  despite  the  lack  of transparency  inherent  in  autocratic  rule.
The  political economy  equilibrium has  to balance  out the  opportunities  for rent-seeking
against the  importance  of sustaining  growth  in  important non-oil  sectors,  including  the
need to boost investment  and  raise employment  and incomes  in labor-intensive,  non-oil
traded  sectors.  Indonesia  in  the  earlier  Suharto  period  is  one  such  case;  Taiwan,
Singapore,  Korea, and to an extent China, offer non-oil examples.  l
v) Predatory Autocracies
Predatory autocracies  are often less  stable than either of the other two types of autocratic
regimes.  Regimes  tend to  act as "roving bandits";  state power faces  few constraints  and
the exploitation of public and private resources  for the gain of elite interests  is embedded
in  institutionalized  practices  with  greater  continuity  than  individual  leaders.  Such
regimes  are nontransparent  and  corrupt;  the  civil  service  runs  entirely  on patronage,  as
public  office  brings  with  it  a host  of rent-seeking  opportunities.  Little  financial  and
human  capital  flows  into  productive  occupations,  whose  returns  are  depressed  by  a
dysfunctional  environment.  Government  itself  is  a  fundamental  obstacle  to  fiscal
restraint  and reform;  oil  revenue  fuels  the  status  quo,  perpetuating  the  oppression  and
poverty  of the people.  Nigeria  under a succession of military  rulers  offers  an example;
and while democracy was restored in  1999,  its institutions have been shaped by a longer
history.
4.  Managing Oil Rents:  Some  Country Cases
4.1  Mature Democracies:  The Case of Norway
The  Orderly Quest  for Rent.  Relative  to  other  oil  exporting  countries,  Norway  has
been  successful  in using its  highly  consensus-oriented  and  parliamentary  institutionsas
well as the  involvement  of interest  groups  representing  business  and labor  to reconcile
competing  claims  over oil rents with long-term  objectives  and stabilization  goals.  This
accomplishment  is  even  more  remarkable,  taking  into  account  that  Norway  has  had
several  changes  in  government,  and  periods  of  weak  minority  government,  since
" Reformist autocracies  are similar to the strong developmental  state described by Leftwich (1995).8
becoming  an oil exporter.  However,  as a small, trade-dependent  nation, Norway also has
a strong pro-stabilization  constituency in the form of employees,  trade union and business
leaders  and voters  dependent on the non-oil tradeables  sectors  for their well-being,  and
with a good  understanding  of the  need  for restraint  in  public  spending.  Compared  to
most other countries,  political differences  are very small,  and values  are egalitarian.  The
high level of transparency  in political  and bureaucratic  processes  reinforces the  general
trust in the integrity of politicians  as well  as in the professional skills of the civil service -
- few Norwegians would question the government's ability to manage Norway's oil rents
in  an  honest  and  efficient  way.  Perhaps  for  this  reason,  Norway  has  not moved  to
distribute  oil  dividends directly  to  citizens  as was  done  in more  individualistic  Alaska,
with the expressed aim of "getting rents out of the hands of the politicians". 12
Reflecting  these  features,  policies  are  very  stable  in  Norway,  despite  changes  in
government,  and policy formulation  has a long-term horizon.'3 However,  more recently,
the move from deficits to structural budget surpluses and the rapid accumulation of assets
in the Government Petroleum  Fund has led to mounting political  pressures for increased
government  spending  of oil  export  incomes  and  made  restraint  more  difficult.  This,
together  with  growing  expenditure  commitments  in coming  decades,  in  particular  for
future  pensions  as  the  population  continues  to  age,  concomitantly  with  the  projected
tapering-off of oil revenues,  has led to concerns over Norway's  ability to sustain its past
success in managing its oil wealth.
First  Phase  --  Priority  to  Maintaining  Competitiveness.  As  Norway  became  a
significant  oil  producer  in  the  1970s,  policies  focussed  on  the  overarching  goal  of
ensuring  the  long-term  competitiveness  of  "Mainland  Norway's"  non-oil  tradeables
sectors  to  maintain  full  employment.  The  strength  of the  constituency  for  cautious
spending  of government  oil  revenues  to  avoid  Dutch  Disease  and loss of job  security
should be seen against the background of the large number of employees in these sectors.
Non-oil traded sectors have also traditionally led wage bargaining rounds,  rather than the
urban and public sector unions which have followed.  The concern  for competitiveness  is
also  closely  linked  to  the  geography  of the  country  and  the  very  strong  interest  in
maintaining  the  economic  viability  of  small,  dispersed  communities  separated  by
mountains  and  fiords,  where  small  and fragmented  labor  markets make  it  difficult  for
workers who become  unemployed to find another job.  Rural  interests have traditionally
exerted a strong influence  on politics in Norway  and have  ensured control  over a main
part  of Norway's  oil  rents  through  large  allocations  for  regional  policy,  support  for
agriculture,  heavy  investments  in  roads,  etc.  The  experiences  of the  mid-1970s  --
Norway  saw  wages  increase  by  51  percent  in  the  1974-76  period,  with  consequent
erosion in international competitiveness  -- added to these concerns.
12  Annual dividends  from Alaska's Permanent  Fund  have  recently been  close to $2,000 per state resident.
Alaska  also  increased  the  private  share  of oil  rents by  abolishing  state  tax.  These  measures  indicate  a
strong populist tendency underpinned by a tradition of individualism.
13 In addition, the high educational  levels of the general population  together  with a reality-oriented  culture
reinforce  understanding of and receptivity to rather complex  analyses of policy choices.9
Subsequent developments  proved these concerns well founded.  Strong economic growth,
spearheaded  by  the  petroleum  sector  and  compounded  by  expansionary  fiscal  and
monetary  policies  in the  first half of the  1980s  resulted  in an overheated  economy with
surging  inflation  and further  loss  of competitiveness  in  the  non-oil  tradeables  sectors,
reflected  in a sharp  drop  in manufacturing  employment.  In  response,  the  government
devalued  the  Krone  several  times  and  increased  subsidies  to  domestic  industries,
including  shipbuilding,  farming  and  fisheries.  By the  mid-1980s,  Norway's  industrial
subsidies were amongst the highest in the OECD area.  However, these developments  can
not be attributed solely to exuberance caused by the inflow of oil rents.  Indeed, despite a
jump in net cash revenues from the petroleum sector by over 6 percentage  points of GDP
(from  a  zero  base)  during  1970-1985,  Norway  was  able  to  restrain  the  increase  in
government  expenditures  to  a  relatively  modest  5-7  percentage  points  of  GDP.  In
contrast, very strong pressures for expanded government services and transfers in Sweden
and Denmark resulted in  government outlays jumping  by about 20 percentage  points of
GDP  --  to nearly  two-thirds  of GDP  in the  case of Sweden  and  Denmark close  behind
during  the  same period.  Against  this  background,  Norway  can  be  deemed  reasonably
successful  in managing its oil wealth.1 4
The  sharp  drop  in  oil  prices  in  early  1986,  hitting  an  economy  already  affected  by
macroeconomic  unbalances,  severely  affected  the  Norwegian  economy,  casing  an
economic  down-turn  that  lasted  for  several  years.  The  government  mandated  a
commission with representatives  of all political parties,  labor, business groups, economic
experts  and public  officials,  to  formulate new policy  guidelines.  They  called  for fiscal
policy  to  be  used  for  counter-cyclical  purposes  with  monetary  policy  targeted  on
maintaining  a  stable  exchange  rate,  while  labor  and  business  leaders  committed
themselves to wage moderation.  There is wide consensus  that this new approach played
a  key  role in the  strong  turn-around  of the  economy  in  the  early  1990s.  Thus,  while
Norway  has  seen periods  of excessive  spending  and  growth  in aggregate  demand  like
other  oil  exporters,  imbalances  have  been brief and  excesses  relatively  modest.  More
importantly,  Norwegian  stakeholders  have  demonstrated  their  ability  to  leam  from
mistakes and to reach consensus to prevent the recurrence of bad management.
A New  Policy  Focus  --  Savings  for  the Future.  Long-term  demographic  projections
point to  a rapid  aging of the Norwegian  population  over coming  decades,  resulting  in
escalating  pensions payments  and health  care  expenditures  for the  elderly that coincide
with  an  projected  tapering  off  of  Norway's  oil  export  income  as  its  reserves  are
exhausted.  Using  projected  pension  needs  over  30  years  to  put  the  oil  rents  in
perspective,  the  government  succeeded  in  creating  support  for  the  goal  of sustained
budget surpluses in order to accumulate savings to fund future expenditure  commitments.
A Government Petroleum Fund was set up in 1990 to manage accumulated  savings (Box
1).  While  maintaining the  competitiveness  of Mainland Norway  remains a key priority,
Norway's  fiscal  and  economic  management  policies  are  now  increasingly  shaped  by
issues related to the appropriate level of saving current oil revenues  for the future.  From
another perspective,  while in the past, Norway's oil rents were to a large  extent captured
14 In recent years, Norway has sustained public spending  at lower levels of GDP than Sweden or Denmark
even though public revenues have comprised  a higher share of GDP.10
by rural  areas  in the  form  of subsidies  for agriculture,  etc.,  retirees  and  pensions  will
increasingly  receive  them  as the  populations  ages  and  the growing  number  of retirees
becomes  a dominant  force in the political landscape.  While  the goal of maintaining  the
competitiveness  and job  security  for  employees  in  the  non-oil  tradeables  sectors  has
constituted  a  strong pro-stabilization  force,  the  future  constituency  of retirees  enjoying
indexed pensions may not have the same interest in restraint.
Box  1.  The Norwegian  Government Petroleum Fund
The Government Petroleum Fund, established in 1990, has two main purposes: (i) act as a buffer
to  smooth  fluctuations  in oil  revenues  and  mitigate  exchange  rate  pressures  to  avoid  Dutch
disease and preserve  a diversified industrial  structure;  (ii)  save part of current oil rents to help
address future needs related to the aging population and the eventual  decline in oil revenues.  At
the end of 2001, the size of the Fund corresponded to about 45 percent of GDP.
The income of the Fund consists of government net cash flow from petroleum activities plus the
return on capital.  Its expenditures are transfers  to the government's  budget.  Thus, the Fund is
an  integrated  part of the  budget:  higher  government  spending  or  lower  taxes  from  mainland
activities  result  in  smaller  allocations  to  the  Fund.  The  annual  allocation  of oil  revenues
between the  budget  and the Fund is flexible, depending on stabilization considerations.
While the detailed guidelines for the Fund's operations  are decided by the government,  it always
consults the Parliament before making substantial  changes to these guidelines.  Transfers to and
from the  fund  need  parliamentary  approval,  and  government  informs  the  Parliament  on the
Fund's status three  times a year.  Comprehensive  information about  the Fund's  operations  are
available  in  quarterly  and  annual  reports,  and  the  Auditor  General  has  the  overriding
responsibility  for  auditing  its  operations.  The  transparent  rules  for  the  Fund's  operations
encourages  citizens  to  feel  confident  to  postpone  consumption  of  their  entitlements  until
reaching retirement decades later.
To protect the integrity  of the budget process, the Fund's assets must be invested abroad  rather
than become a supplementary  source of financing  public  expenditures.  The new guidelines  for
the Heritage Savings Trust Fund in the Province of Alberta,  Canada, which used to invest much
of its assets within the Province as part of the policy to develop the local economy, also mandate
that  its savings  are  invested  outside  of the  Province.  (Emery 2001).  Since  its  inception,  the
Alaska Permanent Fund invests  its savings  out-of-state.  The latter fund,  however,  differs  from
the Norwegian fund in that it returns part of earnings  as dividends to the residents of Alaska as
direct cash payments,  amounting to nearly US$ 2000 per person  in year 2000.  The design of the
Alaska dividend  system  reflects  the strong  individualistic  character  of the Alaskans  and  their
sense of knowing better than the politicians how to use their money.
Saving  versus  Spending  and Tax  Relief:  Towards  a Balance?  In the  1997  election
campaign,  the  governing  Labor  Party  advocated  continued  cautious  public  sector
spending  to  avoid  repeating  the  mistakes  during  the  1980s,  while  several  smaller
opposition parties  called  for increased  spending  on various  social  programs.  Failing to
gamer  wide  support,  a  minority  coalition government  proposed  increased  spending  onpensions  and family allowances.  In 1998, the collapse of global oil prices led to a sharp
decline in the budget surplus, but as oil markets  bounced back in 2000 and the Petroleum
Fund  grew,  political  pressures  to  boost  public  spending  resumed,  especially  by  local
governments, which  are  responsible  for the bulk of spending  on health and  education.
These pressures  proved difficult  to resist, with the visible accumulation  of wealth in the
Petroleum  Fund  blunting  the  concern  for Norway's  large,  longer-term  public  pension
liabilities.  A broad national consensus  for a policy change gathered steam  in the run-up
to the parliamentary elections  in fall  2001.  The governing  Social Democratic  Party ran
on a  platform favoring  an  expansion of expenditures  only, but the elections  paved the
way for a new government,  formed by parties favoring  both an expansion of the welfare
state and a redirection of policy towards reducing Norway's high tax burden.  The 2002
budget incorporates a new fiscal plan which accelerates  the use of oil revenues over the
next ten years and stipulates that the structural  deficit in the central government's  non-oil
budget should be within the 4 percent  expected real return on the Government Petroleum
Fund  assets.  Compared  to  earlier  guidelines,  this  program  raises  the  annual  budget
deficit by an additional  0.4 percentage  points of mainland GDP per year, to 5 percent  in
2010.  While  Norway's  record  of managing  its  oil  wealth  has  generally  been  highly
successful  in building the foundation for an equitable sharing of its oil wealth with future
generations, this recent turn has created some concerns  for the long-term sustainability  of
Norway's fiscal policies, despite large current budget surpluses.
4.2  Factional Democracy:  Oil Rents in Latin America
Relative  to other  countries,  factional  democracies  rank quite  high  in  terms  of political
participation  but rather  low in terms  of transparency  and corruption  (see  Tableaux  p.5).
Despite  important  differences,  Ecuador,  Colombia,  Venezuela  and,  so  some  extent,
Mexico,  share  a tradition of nationalist populism  and  patronage which has strengthened
the political voice of interest  groups  directly  attached  to  state expenditures.  Elites have
little  incentive  for  fiscal  restraint;  leaders  who  make  honest  attempts  to  rationalize
spending  and stimulate  private  sector development  face  general  strikes  and  widespread
rioting,  and  in  the  case  of President  Febres  Cordero  of Ecuador,  kidnap  by  military
paratroopers.  Interest  groups  in  Ecuador,  Colombia  and  Venezuela  have  been  more
stable than the weak and personalized,  political parties.  These countries  also rank low in
terms of policy  stability'  , and have  performed quite poorly in terms of fiscal discipline
and oil revenue management.
Interest Groups, Instability and Earmarking.  Political  developments in Ecuador and
Colombia have  shown  striking  similarities  in recent  years.  Traditional  parties have  lost
their  hegemony  and politics  have  become  more  personal.  The  discovery  of oil  has
caused  intra-party  rivalries  to  flare  as  the  state  becomes  increasingly  important  as
purveyor  of  resources  (Martz  1997).  Lacking  a  consensus  on  transparent  budget
allocation,  groups  have  turned  to earmarking  to assert their interests,  further weakening
overall budget management.  (Box 2).  In Ecuador, numerous governments have launched
attempts  at fiscal restraint  and structural  reform, but none has held up to social pressure
long  enough  to  significantly  alter  its  political  economy.  Urban  population  growth
15  In a recent analysis of business environment surveys, they all rated in  the lowest  14 out of 81  countries.12
accelerated  during the first boom period  in Ecuador, driven by incentives  in the form of
rising consumer  subsidies,  the expansion of public sector wages  and employment,  and  a
decline  in non-oil  taxes  equivalent to  2  percentage  points of GDP (World  Bank  1991).
Attempts  to  introduce  fiscal discipline and structural  adjustment  in the mid  1980s under
President  Febres  Cordero  brought  mild  improvements  in  a number  of macroeconomic
indicators:  however,  in January  1985  Congress called an emergency  session to invalidate
his wage  restraint measures  and the trade  union federation  called  a general  strike.  The
collapse  of oil  prices  in  1986,  followed  by disastrous  earthquakes  in  1987,  forced  the
government  to enact emergency measures  to address  large fiscal  deficits,  including fuel
price  increases  of up  to  80  percent  and 25  percent  increases  in  bus fares  (Corkill  and
Cubit  1988).  These  measures  to adjust to  lower oil rents  provoked  widespread  rioting,
another general  strike, assaults  on members of parliament,  bombardment of government
buildings with Molotov cocktails, and in January  1987,  the abduction of the President by
air  force  paratroopers  (Espinel  et  al  1994).  Shamed  and  devoid  of  support,  Febres
Cordero  reversed  the  process  of reform and initiated  enornous  construction projects  to
benefit his coastal constituency.
Box  2: Earmarking in Ecuador
Despite weak non-oil tax administration  and the resulting volatility in revenues,  in  1999 about
65  percent  of total  tax  revenues  (including  all  oil  revenues)  were  earrnarked  for  specific
programs  or for transfers  to sub-national  governments.  The  earmarking system illustrates  the
strength  of  Ecuador's  network  of  entrenched  interests  vis-a-vis  the  unstable  central
government.  Its  complexity  and  non-transparency  has  produced  unforeseen  and  irrational
distributions  of oil  revenues,  major  beneficiaries  of which  have  historically  included  the
inefficient  and  overstaffed  bureaucracy  of PETROECUADOR,  the  military,  and  the  civil
service  (World  Bank  1991).  14.5  percent  of all  oil revenues  were  earmarked  directly  to  the
military  in  1989;  and 67.6  percent  were  allocated  to  finance  the public  wage  bill  and  other
programs,  notably  the  rural  roads  program,  a  politically  important  source  of patronage.
Earnarking  reduces  the  fiscal  flexibility  of the  central  government,  locking  in spending
increases  during  oil  windfalls  and  forcing  drastic  cuts  in  operating  and  discretionary
expenditures during downswings.
President Borja inherited an inflation-riddled  economy  with a public sector deficit of  16
percent  of GDP. His  first package  of economic reforms  included  moderate  measures  of
fiscal  austerity, 16 but  it  too  was  met  with  a  national  strike,  which  was  particularly
damaging to oil exports.  The powerful bus  and truck  drivers'  union shut down transport
across the country in June  1989 (QER, No.  3 1989), and the President's  support  quickly
eroded  as  continuing  austerity measures  reduced  subsidies  and restrained wages.  As the
Gulf  conflict  of  1990-91  escalated,  the  trade  union  federation,  the  military  and  the
business community descended on the state, demanding  a share of increased oil revenues.
Despite  the  expected  temporary  nature  of high  prices,  Borja  gave  in  and  the  entire  oil
windfall was used to finance increases  in consumption  (World Bank 1991).  Ecuador has
16 However,  17 percent of the  1988 budget had no identified sources of finance and 38 percent was
financed through foreign loans.13
fared little better in the  1990s: in eight years out of the last decade,  fiscal impulses have
exacerbated the oil cycle.
The discovery of significant oil reserves in Colombia in 1993  occurred in the wake of a
process  of political  and  fiscal  decentralization  initiated  by the  1991  constitution.  The
confluence  of  these  two  events  led  to  an  explosion  of  subnational  spending  and
borrowing  as the rules of the game of competition for rents became  'spend more  to get
more'  (Box 3).  Politically  driven  government bailouts  of local and  regional entities  and
state  enterprises  exacerbated  moral  hazard  problems  and contributed  to the doubling  of
state consumption expenditure  in only six years. A stabilization  package initiated in  1999
has  moved  to  check  the  more  egregious  flaws  in  the  decentralization  process,  but
Colombia's  weak central  government  faces  enormous  arrears  in pension payments  and
spending commitments.
Box 3: Fiscal Decentralization  in Colombia
By the mid  1990s, nearly  40 percent  of central  government  revenue (including  all petroleum
revenue,  regardless  of  international  prices)  had  been  earmarked  for  transfer  to  local  and
regional  governments.  As  with  earmnarking  in  Ecuador,  the  transfer  system  tied  central
government revenue to subnational entities through complex rules, creating a national arena for
competition  over  rents.  Under  political  pressure,  based  in  part  on  widespread  expectations
about future  oil revenues, central  government  ignored standards  for transfers, making them to
departments  without  adequate  capacity  while the  transfer  of responsibilities  to  sub-national
governments  lagged far behind the transfer  of revenues.  With weak supervisory  practices  and
regulatory  forbearance,  moral  hazard  led  local  and  regional  entities  to  overspend  and
accumulate  excessive  debt.  The government  bailed  out several  major  territorial  entities  and
their creditors  in the mid  1990s: the implicit  state guarantee  further reinforced  the borrowing
spree.  Bailout  costs  contributed  to  the rapid  acceleration  of state  consumption  expenditure,
which  skyrocketed  from  10 percent  of GDP in  1993  (prior to the inflow of oil receipts  to the
fiscal  coffers)  to  23  percent  of  GDP  in  1999.  Reforms  include  subjecting  sub-national
governments  to credit ratings; it is too  early to tell whether  recourse to independent evaluation
will restore discipline to the consolidated  fiscal system.
The Failure of  "Sowing  the Oil"  Oil  revenues  have  shaped Venezuelan  politics  for
decades,  creating  a rentier state  legitimized by patronage  and entrenched constituencies
whose  continued  loyalty  are attached  directly  to  state expenditures  funded  by oil rents.
Economic  performance  has  been  influenced  by  oil  revenue  volatility  and  "stop-go"
policies,  resulting  in  boom and  bust  cycles.  Transitory  oil price  increases  have  led to
increased  spending,  often  maintained  even  after  oil revenues had fallen again.  Despite
Venezuela's  estimated  $600 billion in oil exports since the early 1970's, real per capita
income  fell by  15  percent  between  1973  and  1985;  since then the decline  in economic
conditions have accelerated  with GDP per capita declining by on average  2.2 percept per
year during the 1985-2000 period.
Following  the sudden large oil windfalls after  1973, Venezuela embarked  on a policy of
extensive  expansion  of the  state's  involvement  in the  economy.  The  oil industry  was14
nationalized  and  large-scale  state  investments  in  capital-intensive  projects  in  steel,
aluminum,  iron ore, and energy were made as part of the drive to diversify the economy
and  reduce  import  dependency.  However,  these  state  enterprises  were  inefficiently
managed  by  political  appointees  without  professional  expertise  and  expected  world
demand for products of the new industries did not materialize  (Nissen and Welsch 1994).
Large-scale  increases  in  employment  based  on  patronage  and  hefty  wages  increases
aimed at enlarging the urban constituency  further eroded the financial  viability of these
enterprises.  Despite  massive  overspending,  the  government  and  state enterprises  were
able to obtain foreign credits without difficulty.  Foreign borrowing also supported rapid
increases  in imports.  The rents received during the  1979-82 oil boom were largely used
up by budgetary subsidies to prop up these enterprises in the face of huge losses.  Despite
modest reforms, the country's fiscal position became increasingly  fragile and, faced with
the  oil  price  downturn  of  1982-83,  the  government  was  unable  to  meet  its  debt
obligations.  Massive capital  flight forced the Black Friday devaluation of February  1983
and  sparked  a deep  recession.  Following  a series  of strikes  by the  trade  unions,  most
reforms  were  abandoned.  In  1982,  the  appropriation  by  the  government,  without
opposition from the  Congress,  of the  US$  5 billion  saved in the investment  fund of the
national  petroleum  company  PDV  widened  the  gulf  between  the  technocracy  of the
company and the political establishment  and sent a clear message that it was futile to try
to sterilize windfalls by (openly) saving abroad (Mommer,  1998).
Entering  office  in  1984,  President  Lusinchi  introduced  fiscal  restraints  and a multi-tier
preferential  exchange  rate  system  to  contain  the  crisis.  However,  continued  strong
pressure  from organized labor and business  soon resulted in another policy reversal  with
increased  minimum  wages  and  subsidies,  stimulating  economic  activity  but incurring
large deficits and tripling inflation to over 30 percent by 1988.  The agency managing the
exchange  rate  system,  riddled with corruption,  effectively  transferred billions of dollars
into  the  hands  of political  elites  (Nissen  and  Welsch  1994).'7  Despite  the  fall  in  oil
revenues following the  1986 price crash,  Lusinchi continued to expand fiscal policy, and
he left office with the highest recorded popularity of any retiring Venezuelan president.
The  new  government  that  took  office  in  February  1989  faced  a  situation  where
Venezuelan  consumers  had to  cope  with  severe  shortages  even of basic  goods  and the
state was at the brink of bankruptcy.  A doubling of petrol prices from their traditionally
very  low  levels  in  the  face  of budget  deficits  running  at  close  to  10  percent  of GDP
triggered massive riots in urban areas, in which over a thousand people were killed.  The
trade unions and much of the business sector united in opposition to liberalization of the
economy,  despite  a lack of a coherent alternative,  and  a  general  strike  was called.  The
president  finally  resigned,  having  failed  to  find  a  constituency  to  support  a  reform
program, and after having barely weathered two bloody coup attempts.
17  Large  employers  obtained  the  right to  repay their  debt at the  pre-devaluation  rate of 4.3  bolivars per
dollar, a scheme which Minister Matos Azocar called "the most outstanding public subsidy ever paid to the
private sector".  In  1998  the  market rate climbed  past  30 bolivars  per dollar in  1986 and  40 bolivars  per
dollar.15
A survey by the Presidential  Commission for State Reform in  1989 found that 80 percent
of the population was dissatisfied  with the democratic  administration  and that 88 percent
believed  that politicians  did nothing but talk and were holding back the public's rightful
wealth  (Nissen  and  Welsch  1994).  Such  attitudes,  elicited  in  the  midst  of  reforms,
contrast  with  the popularity  of President  Lusinchi  at  the  end of an enormous  spending
binge, and indicate  the disillusion that led to the election of President Chavez, backed  by
the  working  and  lower-middle  classes  and  the  military,  which  had  not  traditionally
participated  as  members  of the  political  elite.  Pressures  to  take on  board  even  more
government workers to create jobs for the unemployed has  increased as foreign investors
have  increasingly  fled Venezuela.  The  overall  budget deficit has continued  to fluctuate
widely alongside  the price of oil -- from a surplus of about  7 percent of GDP in 1996 to a
deficit  of 7 percent  in  1998,  back  to a  surplus of 2  percent in 2000 and an  estimated  6
percent deficit in 2001.  Despite Chavez's  inability to bring tangible economic  benefits to
his supporters, he  sustained the passionate  support of Venezuela's  poorest,  as evidenced
by the  reaction to his temporary  ouster  in April  2002.  PDV,  faced with a decline  in the
ratio of operational  revenue to expenses,  is finding it increasingly  difficult  to transfer  the
necessary  proportion  of funds to the  central  government,  slowly  drying  up Venezuela's
rentier economy,  while at the same time the power of the rent-seeking  interests that the
oil  rents have  created,  has  not  deteriorated.  As of mid-2002,  it was  not evident where
Venezuela  would  find a constituency  for  liberal reform  and the necessary  divorce  from
oil-dependent  statism.
Mexico  too  launched  an  ambitious  program  to  "sow  the  oil".  As  PEMEX  began  to
exploit the new-found petroleum reserves  in the south of the country,  Jose Lopez Portillo
entered  with a  vision of oil-led industrialization.  Spurred  on by an exceptional  case of
petromania fuelled  by  very  optimistic  price  projections,'8 the  Mexican  government
launched  enormous  investment  projects,  designed  to  diversify  the economy  and reduce
dependence  on oil. By 1981, capital and intermediate  goods imports had driven Mexico's
trade deficit to US $3.7 billion,  and the  peso had become  significantly  overvalued.  Not
only had an enormous oil windfall been spent, but the state had simultaneously borrowed
heavily.  The politicization of oil had driven state expenditures far past sustainable  levels;
a  slight downturn  in oil prices  in  1982  and  ensuing capital  flight drove  Mexico into  its
second  debt  crisis  in  six  years,  despite  still  high  export  prices.  The  Mexican
government's  management  of oil revenues  improved during the early  1990s,  as hedging
techniques  were  successfully  used  to  buffer  the  expected  temporary  windfall  from  the
Gulf conflict period (Box 4).  This perhaps reflects a learning process within the PRI as a
whole,  built  on  its  regular  experience  of  six  year  crisis  cycles  driven  by  populist
expenditure  patterns.
18 The director of PEMEX assured Congress that oil prices would continue to rise until the year 2000, and
described state-led industrialization  as 'a race against time'  (Morales  et al 1998, pg. 91)  Simulations
suggest that such massive forecasting errors can be very costly when used as a base for fiscal policy (Gelb,
1988).16
Box  4  Hedging Oil Shocks
In  1990-91  Mexico  bought  put  options,  sold  oil futures  and  used.oil  swaps  to hedge  price
risk,  as  well  as  establishing  a  special  contingency  fund  against  oil  price  declines.  The
objective of the strategy was to ensure that it received at least $17 per barrel, the basis for its
1991  budget.  Mexico's experience  shows that such strategies can be successful, but they are
rarely used by exporting governments.  One reason  is asymmetric political risk:  governments
will be blamed for losses of potential revenue if oil prices rise but will receive little credit for
hedging if prices fall.  This suggests that any hedging  strategy should be integrally built into
the budget  and clearly  presented with the  budget,  more as  a forward  purchase  of revenues
than as a forward sale of oil.
Oil Rents  and Incentives  in Factional Democracies.  Especially  in patronage-based
political systems without the tradition of strong national institutions  and the transparency
required  to  establish  a  clear  national  consensus,  oil  revenues  encourage  rent-seeking
behavior  as populist competition  for resources  expands  unchecked.  In Ecuador,  central
government authority is weak and unstable,  as electoral  rules all but ensure  the lack of a
stable  congressional, majority;  between  15  and  18  parties,  largely  ad hoc institutions
assembled  to  back  the  candidacy  of  charismatic  individuals,  were  represented  in
congress  during  the  1980s.  Short,  intense  political  cycles  give  rise  to unstable  policies
and  a very  short  policy  horizon.  Ecuadorian  politics  have  a  strong  tradition  of direct
interference  by  dominant  economic  interests  with  the  formal  democratic  process  and
weak delegation of representation  by organized  groups to political  parties  and congress.
As a result,  "interest groups  are highly divided and parochial  in their  demands, pursuing
predatory  ends with  little  co-operation  in the  quest  for  net  social  gains  [...]  in  a rent
society,  corporate  interests  are  better  prepared  for  defensive  action  than  creative
participation  in the policy process."  (Espinel et al  1994, p19).  The ability of Congress to
resolve  interest  group pressures  is severely  limited; tensions between  the  executive and
the legislature  are extraordinary,  as the one-house legislature  is empowered to act rapidly
and  unilaterally to impeach  technocrats,  raise  minimum  wages without consideration  of
productivity  or inflation,  and earmark revenues  directly to various interests.  Thus, while
oil  rents  did  not  create  Ecuador's  political  institutions,  they  do  exacerbate  their
weaknesses,  which, at the same time, reduces the ability to use rents well.
Colombia's  central government  is similarly  weak vis-A-vis  subnational govermnents  and
social interest  groups.  The Constitutional Court,  formed under the  1991  constitution,  has
established  a dominant  position  in wage  and expenditure  policy,  under  the auspices  of
protecting  fundamental  individual  rights.  One  recent ruling  overturned  a public  sector
wage freeze, requiring  that wages be adjusted upwards every year by at least the level of
inflation'9. The  judicial  branch  therefore  holds  veto  power  over  reforms  and  fiscal
restraint  measures.  Political  cycles have also  become  very extreme  in Venezuela,  with
the  labor movement,  large,  state-subsidized  firms  and small employers  as well as,  more
recently,  the  military,  competing  for  oil  rent  (Nissen  and  Welsch  1994).  Even  the
19 Another judgment mandated increased expenditures on prisons, basing this on "prisoners'  rights.
Colombia Constitutional Court Judgments T-296/98  and T-153/9817
formally independent  central bank has no ability to check politically motivated spending,
as presidents can remove the central banker at will.
Mexico  faces a very different  set of political  constraints.  Until  the last decade  the PRI
dominated  the  state.  It  claimed  legitimacy  in  revolutionary  nationalism,  and  tightly
controlled  the  labor  unions,  the  military,  and  other  social  interests  (Klesner  1997).
However,  the PRI was far from  a unitary actor; within its clientelist networks and in the
greater  political  arena,  political  support  was  allocated  by  the  promise  and  delivery  of
patronage.  Presidents won office on promises of high wages, employment  and subsidies,
as  well  as  on  quieter  commitments  to  the  allocation  of rent-seeking  opportunities  to
supporters  among the  political  elite.  The allure  of politically  allocated  rents drew many
bright minds away from productive  enterprise and into the fold of the PRI.  Time will tell
whether  political  apertura in  Mexico  will  lead  to  democratic  maturation  or  back  to
populist  politics. After the  historic  fall  of the presidency  to  Vicente  Fox of the PAN,  a
political  struggle  in  Congress  resulted  in  the  earmarking  of expected  oil  revenues  for
increased  social expenditure-  revenues  'expected'  due to a substantial  upward revision
in oil price projections.20
4.3  Traditional Autocracies:  Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
The Gulf states depend heavily  on rents from the exploitation of state-owned  petroleum
reserves to  fund their development  efforts and generous  welfare policies.  Over the past
25 years they have  gone through a far-reaching social and economic transformation while
maintaining  social  stability.  Despite  ample  reserves,  new development  challenges  over
coming  decades  will  test  their  ability  to  reconcile  traditional  institutions  with  the
requirements of a modem economy in an increasingly competitive global environment.
The Years  of Plenty.  In the  years  following the  first oil boom, the  Gulf governments
embarked on massive investment programs with priority to basic infrastructure, aiming to
transfer  part of the  windfall  to the  population  at large as well  as  to  future  generations.
Substantial  investments  were  also  made  in  the social  sectors.  The  population  at large
benefited  from generous  welfare schemes in the form of access to housing grants, as well
as  basic foodstuffs,  fuels,  water and electricity  at highly  subsidized  rates.  Expansion of
the  government  sector  served  the  dual  purpose  of providing  public  services  for  the
population and job opportunities for Gulf nationals.  Most of the Gulf states also initiated
programs  to  build up domestic  industrial  capacity,  boosted  by very generous  subsidies.
These  programs  envisioned  using  abundant  hydrocarbon  resources  as  feedstock,  and
aimed  to  diversify  economies  away  from  extreme  reliance  on  oil rents.  After  1973,
limited absorptive capacity to formulate and implement development programs -- coupled
with a small, if rapidly growing, population and the sheer magnitude of the rent transfer -
initially  led  to  a  huge  accumulation  of  official  foreign  reserves.  Local  businesses
amassed  fortunes  on lucrative  government  contracts.  Since the development  programs
designed  by  benevolent  governments  ensured  that  everybody  gained  from  the  newly
acquired fortunes, the programs received broad popular support.
20 "Recortos al gasto publico, anticipa Ernesto Zedillo" in El Financiero,  Jan. 6 2000 pg. 818
In  many  ways,  the  programs  initiated  during  the  oil  boom  years  have  met  with
considerable  success  in  raising  living  standards,  including  a  massive  expansion  in
education.  However,  the Gulf states  generally  have not been  able to translate  the  huge
investments  in  infrastructure  and  human  development  into  vigorous,  self-sustained
private  sector growth.  Instead, the  efficiency of investment has been  steadily declining,
reflecting poor screening of the economic viability of projects.  (Auty 2001).  At the same
time,  the  socioeconomic  implication  of the  "welfare-state"  strategies  followed  by  the
Gulf states  -- with focus on the distribution of oil wealth through public programs rather
than  on  developing  new  sources  of wealth  - also  created  severe  unintended  structural
anomalies  in  the  form  of persistent  dependence  on  oil  for  export  earnings  and  fiscal
revenues,  overgrown  public  sectors  whose  omnipresence  in  the  economy  stifles  the
private  sector,  distorted  incentives  to work,  and  extreme  dependence  on government  to
provide jobs for Gulf nationals.
The End of the Boom.  As oil revenues  fell  dramatically  after the mid-1980s, the Gulf
governments resorted to large-scale  draw-down of accumulated foreign assets to fund the
completion of the infrastructure  investments  initiated during the boom years.  However,
long-term  expenditure  commitments  also  grew  due to the expansion  of public  services,
including education,  health, and growing public sector employment.  Petroleum revenues
remained broadly  flat, resulted in growing fiscal strains over the coming years.  21  Faced
with  persistent  fiscal  deficits  since  the  early  1980s,  the  Saudi  government  initiated
domestic  borrowing  in  1988,  and  domestic  debt  now  significantly  exceeds  usable
reserves.  As fiscal pressures continued to mount, recurrent expenditures  for maintenance
and subsidies as well as capital outlays were cut back, while efforts were initiated to raise
non-oil revenues.  As non-oil sector growth  stagnated while the number of new entrants
to  the  labor  market  escalated  throughout  the  1990s,  the  tightening  fiscal  constraint
constrained  the  scope  for  continuing  to  use  the  public  sector  to  absorb  job-seeking
nationals.  In the case of Saudi Arabia, annual non-oil sector growth  is estimated to have
been  a minuscule  1.2 percent  during the  1990s,  relative  to a labor force  growth  rate of
over  4  percent,  reflecting  high  fertility  rates  during  the  oil  boom  years.  Only  some
40,000 of the 120,000 Saudi nationals who entered the labor market in 1999 were able to
find jobs in the non-oil private sector.  22
Cautious  reforms  aimed  at addressing  the  underlying  structural  problems  behind  these
trends were  initiated  during  the  1990s.  The collapse  of oil prices  in early  1998  in the
wake of the Asian Crisis  severely affected the  fiscal  situation of the Gulf countries  and
strengthened  the political  awareness  of the  need  for structural  and  institutional  reform.
Local  discontent  has  been  growing  over  unemployment  and  reductions  in  per  capita
incomes  while  privileged  "groups"  are  seen  as  basking  in  conspicuous  consumption'
inconsistent  with traditional  values, and funded  by the capture  of an undue  share of the
21  The Kuwaiti government - which already employs 93 percent of all nationals in the labor force - saw its
payroll  cost grow by well  over 6  percent per annum  in the  1995-2000  period,  even as  total and recurrent
budgetary  expenditures  remained  constant  in  nominal  terms,  resulting  in  crowding  out  of  other
expenditures, in particular,  capital outlays.
22 Saudi American  Bank, August 2001.19
remaining  subsidies.  At the  same time,  the eternal  but elusive  hope of recovery  in  oil
revenues together with resistance from groups that see their interests threatened  have thus
far limited  the  scope  of reform.  The  strong  consensus  culture  of the  Gulf countries  -
while an asset in terms of solid support for decisions once made - also retards  the pace of
reform.
The  Challenge  to  Overcome:  Obstacles  towards  A  New  Development  Paradigm.
Over the next decade, the Gulf states will face mounting fiscal pressures to expand public
services because  of population  growth  -- on top of high payroll costs.  While remaining
oil  and  natural  gas  reserves  may last  for up  to  100  years  at  current  levels  of production
for  several  of the  Gulf countries,  the  scope  for  boosting  oil  revenues  beyond  current
levels  is constrained  by OPEC  agreements  and  the  realities  of competition  from  other
suppliers with  liberal oil tax regimes.  The public sector  can no longer be used to absorb
the rapidly increasing number of new entrants to the labor market.  These trends  generate
an urgent need to accelerate  non-oil private sector growth to create new job opportunities
for  Gulf nationals.  However,  to  realize  this objective,  Gulf governments  will  have  to
abandon  development  strategies  pursued  over  the  past  quarter  century  and  overcome
severe political hurdles towards  a sustainable strategy.
Despite  stable  macroeconomic  conditions,  the dominance  of petroleum  and the  strength
of  the  local  currencies  continues  to  frustrate  progress  on  developing  the  non-oil
tradeables  sectors.  The notable  exception  is the United  Arab  Emirates  - spearheaded  by
the  Dubai  Emirate  (which  anticipates  the  depletion  of  its  oil  reserves  over  the  next
decade)  that has followed a liberal,  business-friendly and market-oriented  strategy aimed
at diversifying the economy.  However, given the generally high import content in private
consumption  in  the  economies  of the  Gulf states,  exchange  rate  adjustment  to  promote
economic  diversification  and  create  non-oil  private  sector  jobs  in the  long  run  would
meet strong resistance  from the general population facing immediate  price increases  and
reductions  in  real  per  capita  incomes,  and  creating  social  discontent  that  could  be
exploited  by powerful groups.  At the same time, the prospective gains,  in terms of future
job opportunities  in the non-oil  sectors for Gulf nationals,  are  likely to be too abstract to
create a strong constituency.  Influential  groups  with interest  in investing abroad to raise
returns or avoid real or perceived political  risks would also probably oppose an exchange
rate adjustment of the required magnitude.  Gulf governments  would see net  gains from
an  exchange  rate  adjustment,  but  their  expenditure  commitments  are  now  such  as  to
preclude  the  option  of sterilizing  part of these  gains  in savings  funds  with  assets  held
abroad to sustain the adjustment  -- a viable option until some  10-15 years ago.
Opposition to  the reform of widespread producer  and consumer  subsidies will also have
to be overcome if a more rational price structure is to support efficient investments in line
with comparative  advantage.  Saudi  Arabia has made progress by eliminating  budgetary
transfers  to  fund  subsidies  for  agriculture,  industry,  and  housing  in recent  years  - thus
limiting subsidized credits  to what is available  through repayment  of old loans.  But the
Gulf countries  will still  have to overcome  strong consumer  resistance  (and  worries  that
some  groups  might  exploit  consumer  discontent)  to rationalizing  charges  for  water  and
electricity  with  the  aim  of enhancing  the  private  sector's  interest  in investing  in  these20
sectors as well as curtailing waste.  Entrenched interests are also likely to delay education
reform to make curricula more relevant to the needs of a modem economy.
Strong and deeply entrenched interests have also largely frustrated  attempts to address the
perceived lack of transparency and predictability  in legal and regulatory frameworks  that
continues to constrain private sector take-off in the  Gulf.23 The judiciary is widely seen
as lacking appreciation  for the requirements of modem business legislation and the need
for a level playing field, while suffering from capacity problems that results in extremely
long delays  in  settling commercial  disputes.  Red tape,  in the  form of requirements  for
permits  and licenses,  still persists in varying degrees  and contributes  to  a generally poor
competitive  environment,  slowing  structural  change  while  creating  handsome  rents  for
well-connected  business  interests.  As  the  world  increasingly  moves  towards  an
integrated,  information  and knowledge-driven  economy,  the general  lack of even  basic
statistical  information  and  easy access  to rules and regulations  - making,  for example,
market analyses  and feasibility  studies  hard  - will  become  an even  more  severe draw-
back.
4.4.  Predatory and Modernizing Autocracies:  Nigeria and Indonesia
Like the Gulf States, Nigeria and Indonesia have both had autocratic  governments  over
most of the last three decades, and both rank very low in terms of transparency.  Yet they
offer contrasting experiences in the management of oil rents, with much of the difference
traceable to political factors.
From Predatory Autocracy to Factional Democracy?  Oil represents an estimated  37
percent  of GDP  in  Nigeria,  and  63  percent  of  consolidated  government  revenues24.
Management  of  this  resource  has  historically  been  driven  by  political  economy
considerations.  Oil resources  are controlled  by the  public sector  and have traditionally
greased  the  functioning  of  an  extensive  machinery  of  rent  seeking  and  political
patronage.  Oil has also been used, with some success, to hold together a fragile "political
coalition" of diverse ethnic and religious interests.  Not surprisingly, public expenditures
have  always  ratcheted  out  of  control  during  oil  booms,  creating  considerable
macroeconomic  instability.  Forced  and  painful  adjustment  has  typically  followed.
Desire for and ability to achieve reforms have  also been low or non-existent.  During the
past 20-30  years,  it  is estimated  that  some  $300 billion  in oil  revenues  has  enriched  a
small  group  of politically  and socially  influential  elite,  while  the majority of Nigerians
have  become  impoverished.  Growth  has  been  stagnant  and  per  capita  income  is
estimated to have fallen from about $800 in the early  1980s to about $300 today.
Under Nigeria's periods  of military dictatorship,  the federal  executive  alone determined
how  the  oil cycle  was  managed.  After  an  initial  lag  in  1973  and  1974,  when  large
surpluses were  accumulated  abroad,  public capital  spending accelerated  so strongly that
by  1976  it  alone  accounted  for  more  than the  entire  increase  in oil  revenue.  Current
23  A beginning to reform has been made with the recent adoptions of new investment laws and other
institutional reforms in Kuwait,  Oman and Saudi Arabia.
24 Average of the past 7 years  1995-2001.21
spending too rose sharply,  with a doubling of pay for civil  servants, following the review
of the  Udoji  Commission,  a  decision  widely  interpreted  as  an  effort  to rally  support
behind the announcement  by General  Gowon that the country was  not ready to return to
civilian  rule.  Even the second  oil price rise was not sufficient to bring the budget  back
into  surplus,  so  that  after  1975  the  country  faced  growing  fiscal  and  current  account
imbalances,  and after 1981  a rapid accumulation of external debt, accompanied by capital
flight.  Increased  government  spending  did not  accelerate  growth;  neither  is  it easy to
find  evidence  of the massive,  if temporary,  increase  in overall  welfare  that  would have
been  expected  during. the period  of sharp real  appreciation  that followed  the spending
binge.  One  explanation  is  that Nigeria's  potential  gains  were  absorbed  in  the  sharply
growing  inefficiency  of  a  corrupt  and  progressively  more  wasteful  and  distorted
economy  (Gelb,  1988).  Agriculture  and manufacturing  atrophied,  and the country has
steadily de-electrified.
In Nigeria's  emerging democracy there are more actors and consequently things are more
complex.  But fiscal policies following the oil price boomlet of 2000-2001  were not much
different from those during previous periods.  States and local governments now control a
larger share of oil revenues, mainly because constitutional provisions on revenue sharing
between  the  three tiers  are  now being  strictly  adhered to.  Over the  past year,  state  and
local  government  demands  - backed  by  constitutional  mandates  that  shares  of all oil
proceeds  be  distributed  to  them  to  fund  their rapidly  expanding  spending  programs.  --
have  frustrated  federal  government  efforts  to  institute  a  savings  mechanism  for  oil
windfall  revenues which would  have sterilized revenues  corresponding  to  10  percentage
points  of GDP  in  2001.  Following  recent  decisions,  states  receive almost half of all
Federal  income,  while  the  Federal  government  faces  massive  pension  obligations  and
domestic  debt service.  At the federal level, the  legislature, absent for 18 years, is again a
player with a strong belief it has constitutional powers  to change the executive's budget
to reflect  its own  (or multiple  members')  agenda  for spending.  The 2000  and the  2001
appropriations  bills have both been much larger than the executive's  proposals.  Finally,
there  is  increased  tension  between  demands  for  "derivation  of revenues  to  the  oil
producing  states"  and "redistribution  across  all states".  Oil producing  states have  been
successful  in getting  13  percent  of oil revenues  to  be paid to  them as  derivation  since
2000.
No effective  agents of restraint  have  emerged  from  this  larger  number of actors.  The
federal  executive's  efforts  in this regard were neither credible  nor successful.  Between
1999  and  2001,  as  Nigeria's  oil  receipts  rose  from  $7.8  billion  to  $15.3  billion,
consolidated  government  spending  increased  from  $12.2  billion  to  $21.7  billion.  The
fundamental  drivers  of  the  process-the  politics  of patronage,  support  of  a  large
bureaucracy  (in May  2000 public sector wages  were more  than doubled),  and keeping  a
diverse and  often fractious  polity together--  remain the same.  Over  the years,  this has
created  a dynamic that has not only led to huge levels of government  spending  but to a
widely-shared  belief in Nigeria that large public  programs  and  spending are normal and
desirable.  The  most  recent  factor-the  need  to  deliver  "democracy  dividends"--is
unfortunately  seen  as  a  call  for  larger  public  sector  spending  and  thus  perversely
continues the  same  approach.  Overall,  it is estimated  that the general  government  may22
itself absorb some 70 percent of Nigeria's oil income,  leaving little over for the rest of the
impoverished  population.  Efforts  to contain  spending  through "value for money"  audits
and  compliance  with  due  process  in  spending  appear  to  have  little  impact  on  its
effectiveness.
Outcomes  in the management of Nigeria's oil cycle in the new democracy are thus so far
not much different  from the past pattern,  illustrating the fact that political institutions  are
shaped  by a  longer  history than  the current  political  regime.  The key  feature  remains
excessive  and  unsustainable  increases  in  public  spending  on  the  upswing,  with
considerable  macroeconomic  instability,  and  little  to  show  in  growth  and  economic
development.  This was  a central factor in the recent agreement between Nigeria  and the
IMF  not  to  pursue  a  formal  monitoring  program.  Faced  with  mounting  resource
shortfalls,  Nigeria's  2002  budget  proposed to  significantly raise  non-oil  revenues  to  19
percent of GDP  or 45  percent  of total revenue,  despite  the likely adverse  effect  on  an
already  costly and  unattractive  investment environment  and the  ineffectiveness  of state
spending (Box 5).
Box  5.  Should Nigeria Cut Non-Oil  Taxes?
Viewed  in the context of other countries, Nigeria's  proposed non-oil  tax ratio of 19 percent
of GDP  seems not unreasonable.  Yet it may be excessive  in a context where the marginal
value  of  public  resources  is  surely  lower  than  that  of  income  circulating  in  the  private
economy,  and  where the  fiscal  problem  has  been mainly  on the  spending,  rather than the
revenue,  side.  Some  have  proposed  a drastic  cut  in tariffs  and  taxes  as  a mechanism  to
reduce  the  state's  role,  to  decrease  corruption  and  to transfer  income  to  private  agents.
Others have  suggested  investing heavily  in electrification  so that cheap power can help the
re-industrialization  of the  country.  Political  realities  suggest  that  efforts  to radically  scale
back the weight of the state in Nigeria are unlikely to be successful.  Yet the economic  record
also  suggests  that  fiscal  deficits  do  not  constitute  a  sound  argument  to  increase  non-oil
taxation.
From reformist  autocracy  to --  what??  Like  Nigeria,  Indonesia  was  a poor,  largely
rural  economy,  and  its  initial  response  to  the  oil  windfall  of 1973-74  was  to  rapidly
increase  development  spending.  Half of the  rent eamed during  the  first oil  boom was
devoted  to  a  wide  variety  of programs  especially  in  agriculture,  and  to  economic
infrastructure,  largely  in rural  areas.  Assessments  of these  programs,  such  as  BIMAS,
INMAS  and  other  efforts  at  agricultural  intensification  suggest  that,  despite  some
problems,  they  laid the  foundation  for agricultural  growth  at rates  well  exceeding  the
average  for developing  countries  let alone  oil  exporters.  INPRES,  the  labor-intensive
public works programs, also  appear to have been  successful,  creating  1.5 million person-
years of work in  1982. Among  other achievements,  primary  school  construction helped
boost  enrollment  from 77  percent  in  1970  to  100  percent  by  1978.  Fertilizer  subsidies
averaged  11  percent of development  spending,  and  Indonesia's  abundant  gas  reserves
were  hamessed to  provide  a  supply of low-cost  agricultural  inputs to  complement  the
introduction of high-yielding rice varieties.23
Concern  over real appreciation  of the rupiah led to a devaluation  in November  1978,  but
this came just before the  second oil price spike.  A less cautious  govermnment might have
encouraged  greater foreign borrowing by public firms or increased its own borrowing:  it
might  at  least have  maintained  its  balanced  budget  rule which  had been applied  by  the
Suharto  government  since  1967,  albeit  somewhat  flexibly. 25 But although  the  budget
was balanced  in a formal  sense,  spending controls were applied to create a substantial de
facto  surplus  that  was  not  widely  known,  including  to  the  parliament.  Claims  of the
banking system on government fell sharply, and  reserves  doubled to $5 billion.  26 As oil
prices fell  after  1981,  Indonesia also moved  aggressively with a drastic re-phasing  of its
development plan,  canceling  investments  and cutting  subsidies  and  spending,  as  well as
stabilizing its real exchange rate through progressive  devaluations.  Growth, high during
the boom years,  was sustained far better than in other oil exporters,  and non-oil exports,
notably manufacturing  and, after 1979, LNG, continued to grow.
The shaping  of political  economies.  Why  did Indonesia  manage  so much better than
Nigeria  during  this  period,  both  in terms  of fiscal  and  macroeconomic  control  and  in
terms  of the  effectiveness  of public  spending?  A  large  part of the  answer  lies  in their
different  political  economies.  Since  independence,  political  power  and  economic
strategies  in  Nigeria  have  tended  to  be  defined  in  regional  and  ethnic,  rather  than  in
occupational  or  class  terms.  This  has  led  to  continuous  search  for  a  constitutional
formula  to  hold  together  the  Nigerian  Federation  and  to  an  ongoing  battle  over  the
regional allocation of public revenues.  In none of the dominating parties prior to military
rule  were  farming  interests  well  represented;  neither  was  there  active  commitment  to
increasing equity.  Pressures from poor farmers were  blunted by ethnic cleavages  (Bates,
1981,  Bienen  1985)  and  the  widespread  desire  to  leave  the  agricultural  sector,  while
pressures  from  the  urban  elite  - with  interests  increasingly  tied  to  spending  decisions
funded by oil revenues  - grew  sharper.
History  shaped  Indonesia's  politics  differently.  The condition  of its  economy  when the
Suharto regime  came to power in  1967  could  hardly have  been worse.  The increasingly
chaotic "Guided  Democracy"  of the  Sukamno  government  had been more  destructive,  in
economic  termns,  than  many  conflicts.  hinflation  had reached  600  percent;  shortages  of
food,  especially rice,  contributed  to  political  instability  and  to a huge  drop in  GDP,  the
magnitude of which will never be known  because of the  demise of the statistical system.
Economic  stabilization  and  reconstruction,  especially  in rural  areas,  was  crucial  for the
survival of the new regime.  A team of economic  advisers  was constituted, which proved
to  have  both  exceptional  influence  and  continuity2  . Food  security'  was  the  prime
objective  of  the  new  development  policy  (Tracee  Baru),  together  with  exports,
macroeconomic  stabilization  and  financial  sector  reform,  and an  impressive  turnarounid
25  In implementing the rule, development  assistance  was considered as "above the line".
26in  interviews  wihgovernment, oeof the  authors  asked  why the exetof the  surplus  wsntwidely
apparent  to  parliamentary  representatives  from  the  monetary  accounts.  The  response  was  that  few
members understood  the accounts,  and those  few  that did  also understood  the reason  for  savings  and  for
doing so quietly, to avoid accusations  that "the people's money"  was not being spent on them.
27 Three of the five core members were recent graduates of the University of Califomnia and became  known
as the "Berkeley  Mafia".24
bolstered the credibility  of the new government.  The remarkable  Pertamina Crisis - the
failure of the  economic  fiefdom constructed around  the national  oil company  to service
its  debts  in  1975  - both  strengthened  the  hand  of the  technocrats  and  reinforced  the
cautious elements in government.
Good  economic  management  was further  encouraged  by two  features.  First,  the power
base of the government - in addition to the army  - was GOLKAR,  a coalition of diverse
functional  groups  with a  strong representation  of farmers,  women,  workers  and youths,
rather  than  a  narrowly  based  political  party.  This  provided  a  vehicle  for  developing
consensus,  and  reduced  rivalries  over  how  oil  revenues  were  to  be  spent.  Second,
Indonesia's  economy  was  overwhelmingly  rural-in  1970  only  17  percent  of  the
population lived in urban areas, most with strong rural ties - and stabilization of the rural
population,  especially  in  land-scarce  Java,  was  a  critical  policy  priority.  Even  in  an
autocratic  setting,  the  non-oil  tradeables,  agriculture  and  increasingly,  labor-intensive
industry,  therefore  constituted  a major political  interest  group with a  direct concern  for
the quality of public  spending  as  well as for avoiding extreme  appreciation of the  real
exchange  rate.  Unlike Nigeria,  Indonesia therefore  had the benefit of effective agents
of restraint through the first oil windfall.  Its political challenge would only emerge later.
5.  Conclusions
This  study has reviewed  the political  economy  of fiscal and economic management  in a
number of oil exporters with widely differing political  systems, emphasizing the issues of
long-term savings,  short-medium-term  stabilization  and the effective use of rent income.
While  these  are  different  objectives,  they  are  all  part  of  good  economic  and  fiscal
management,  and countries that have  been able to do well in one area have typically been
able to well  in others.  Not all objectives  are reasonable  for all countries;  in particular,  it
may  not be  realistic  to  expect  poor  exporters  still  dependent  on official  development
assistance to save for extended periods.
Oil rents widen the  set of policy choices:  in principle, countries  can do better than they
would  have  done  without  rents.  However,  as  has  been  demonstrated  in  numerous
studies, oil exporters'  economic performance  has, with few exceptions, been poor.  Since
the  first  oil  booms,  evidence  has  accumulated  on  better  technical  approaches  towards
managing  resource  rents,  especially  "point-source"  rents  from  oil  and  hard  mining,  as
well  as on the high  cost of  "stop-go"  and failure to use  rents well  to support  a broader
process  of development.  Looking  forward,  the  main factors  determining  the  success  of
mineral exporters  are less  likely to be technical  and more  likely to relate to the political
economy of managing rents.
More  and  less  successful  cases  offer  some  suggestions.  Mature  democracies  clearly
have  some  advantages  because  of their  ability  to  reach  consensus,  their  educated  and
informed  electorates and a level  of transparency that facilitates clear decisions on how to
use  rents  over a  long  horizon.  Yet  even  in these  systems  (with institutions  that were
28 Non-oil traded sectors  were also important constituencies  for stable economic  management in Malaysia,
in particular tin, rubber, and increasingly  assembly operations  (reference).25
shaped  well  before  oil  rents  became  large),  conservative  management  is  a continuing
struggle.  Reformist or traditional  autocracies can also sustain long decision horizons and
implement  developmental  policies.  But their resistance  to transparency and  the danger
that  oil-led  spending  becomes  the  major  legitimizing  force  behind  the  state  raises
problems  of  "lock-in",  mounting corruption  and political  transition.  Little positive  can
be  expected  from predatory  autocracies,  which sometimes  have  shorter horizons  and the
characteristics of "roving bandit" regimes.
Factional  democracies  present  particular  challenges,  because  they  lack  a  sufficiently
effective  political  system  to  create  a  consensus  among  strong  competing  interests.
Special  attention  will  be  needed  to  increase  transparency  and  raise  public  awareness.
There may be a threshold of democratic  maturity, below which political competition will
not help in managing oil incomes well.  And oil income makes it more difficult to sustain
a constituency  in favor of sound,  longer-run  economic  management,  because  it weakens
incentives  for  agents  to  support  checks  and  balances  that  impinge  on  their  individual
plans to appropriate  the rents.
Constituencies  in  favor  of  cautious  management  can  include:  a  well-informed  civic
society ("keep it out of the hands of the politicians",  as in Alaska); parliament  (effective
consensus-building  underpinning  a transparent  budgetary  process  as  in Norway);  those
dependent  on  the  non-oil  traded  sectors  (agriculture  and  fisheries,  which  lead  wage-
bargaining  in  Norway,  rice  in  Indonesia,  and  tin  and  rubber  in  Malaysia).  These
constituencies will benefit from public information and education programs.
Similarly,  attempts must be made to get the political  debate to span longer horizons.  Oil
euphoria  can  be  dampened  by  comparing  rents  to  long-run  obligations,  such  as  the
present value of pension obligations  or to debt service:  paying off Pertamina's  debt while
oil prices were high was a great stabilizer for Indonesia.
Norway's  experience  also  suggests  a  case  for integrating the  treatment of special  funds
into  the budget  -- technical  rules will not prevail  against  lack of political  will, and  this
also can provide a check  against  manipulation.  Surpluses  should be invested  abroad,  to
reduce  the risk of politicization.  Integration  of oil funds  with the  regular budget avoids
the risk of competing decisions on spending and facilitates accountability and oversight.
Hedging has been little used by exporters but can help buffer export price risk.  However,
it will  be  more  politically  saleable  if integrated  into budget  formulation,  and  recast  as
buying  a  slice of government  spending  forward,  or buying  debt  service  forward,  rather
than  selling  oil forward.  There may be a role for international  agencies  in guaranteeing
hedging contracts to neutralize part of the risk.
External  agents  of restraint  may  also  have  a  role  in  strengthening  management.  For
large-scale  industrial projects, private  investors  can only be  agents of restraint  and risk-
sharing  if their shares  are large  enough to make their  profits  depend on performance  of
the investment rather than supplying  inputs.  Credit ratings for sub-national  governments
offer possible indicators of management  effectiveness.  If there is a lack of trust between26
federal  and  state  governments,  possibly  international  agencies  could  help  by  offering
certified  savings  facilities for states wishing to retain control of their own  surpluses.  In
extreme cases,  such as Chad (Box 6), the government  can commit to be restrained by the
rules  set  by  external  agents.  Such  cases  are  likely  to  be  very  rare,  but  may  suggest
approaches to exporters which are still aid-dependent.
Box 6  Chad - Management of oil revenues
Chad  will  become  an  oil  exporter  in  2003  under  unique  arrangements,  designed  in
consultation  with  the principal  private  investor in the project and  international  donors,  and
aimed  at  addressing  the  risk  of  fiscal  and  economic  mismanagement  when  a  poor  and
institutionally  very  weak  country  suddenly  sees  a  large  inflow  of oil  income.  The  key
elements of the law that will govern the management of Chad's oil revenues are:
1.  Net  incomes  (dividends  and  royalties)  shall  be  deposited  in  an  offshore  escrow
account.
2.  Direct net incomes  shall be allocated as follows:
*  10  percent  in  a  savings  account  (Future  Generations  Fund)  to  be  opened  in  an
international  financial institution;
*  80  percent of the  remaining  amount to be  used  for expenditures  in priority sectors
(public  health  and  social  affairs,  education,  infrastructure,  rural  development,
environment and water resources);
*  5 percent of royalties to the development of the producing region (Doba);
*  remaining  15 percent for Government operating and investment expenses.
3.  An Oil Revenues  Control and Monitoring Board is changed with the responsibility to
ensure that commitments  from the accounts  meet the requirements  of the Finance  Act,
and to  authorize and  monitor disbursements.  The Board comprises  nine members,  four
of  which  are  representatives  from  the  civil  society  (one  NGO,  one  trade  union
representative,  one  religious  leader,  and  one  representative  for  the  human  rights
associations) and one is a parliamentarian  from the opposition in the Parliament.
The main purpose of the offshore accounts is to ensure proper accounting,  including  annually
published audits, of the revenues.  Donors will undertake  annual public expenditure  reviews
to monitor  the  use of oil  revenues.  While  oil will represent  a very  large boost to  Chad's
development options,  adding  50 percent to annual budgetary revenues,  the country  will still
need to attract other private investment and foreign aid.  The  level of future donor assistance
will depend on-the Government's compliance with the above agreements.
Transfers can be a mechanism  for both distributing  oil rents and economic  stabilization.
Only  a  few countries  can implement  a  transparent  "Alaska-style"  system of direct  rent
check  transfers  to  individuals,  but  there  may  be  potential  for  using  rents  to  make
transparent  transfers  to  communities  or  schools  as  in  Uganda  (Renikka  and  Svenson,
1999).
Particularly  in countries  with poor tax  administration  and  low-quality  public  spending,
the combination of high non-oil taxes and oversized government suggests the existence of
large deadweight losses  There can be  also strong  arguments  for a combination of very27
low  non-oil  tax  rates  plus  a  heavy  focus  on  improving  tax  administration  to  provide
greater fiscal flexibility.
In  the  end,  no  single  mechanism  is  likely  to  provide  a  silver  bullet:  oil-exporting
governments  will  need  to use a  combination  of approaches.  They  should  hedge  more;
hold  larger  reserves;  adopt  more  conservative,  transparent  and  flexible  budgeting,  and
transfer part of the rents to individual  citizens during boom periods to reduce pressure  for
explosive  spending  followed  by lock-in  and fiscal  crisis  during  the  downturn.  Some
countries are well-placed to learn from experience;  others, unfortunately,  appear to have a
long way to go.28
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yearTable 2. Political  Economy Classification of Oil Exporters
Political Features  Institutional Implications  Economic Implications
Mature Democracy:  *  long horizon  *  savings likely
*  stable party system  *  policy stability,  transparency  *  expenditure  smoothing, stabilization
*  range of social consensus  . high competitiveness,  low transactions costs  . rents transferred to public through
*  strong, competent,  insulated bureaucracy  *  strong private / traded sector, pro-  government-provided  social services and
*  competent,  professional judicial system  stabilization interests vis-A-vis pro-spending  insurance or direct transfers
*  highly educated electorate  interests
Factional Democracy:  . short horizon  *  savings very difficult
*  government and parties often unstable  relative to  *  policy instability,  nontransparency,  high  *  procyclical expenditure;  instability
interest groups  transactions costs  *  rents transferred to different interests
*  political support gained through clientelistic ties and  . strong state role in production  and to public through subsidies, policy
provision of patronage  . strong interests attached  directly to state  distortions, public employment
•  wide social disparities, lack of consensus  expenditures;  politically weak private non-oil
*  politicized bureaucracy and judicial system  sector and pro-stabilization interests
Paternalistic Autocracy:  . long horizon  *  procyclical  expenditure,  mixed success
stable government;  legitimacy originally from  *  policy stability, nontransparency  with stabilization
traditional role, maintained through rent distribution  *  low competitiveness,  high transactions costs  *  risk of unsustainable long-term
*  strong cultural elements  of consensus,  clientelistic  . strong state role in production  spending trajectory  leading to political crisis
and nationalistic patterns  . strong interests  attached directly to state  *  little economic  diversification
*  bureaucracy provides both services and public  expenditures;  weak private sector
employment
Reformist Autocracy  *  long horizon  *  expenditure  smoothing, stabilization
*  stable government,  legitimized by development  *  policy stability, nontransparency  *  state investment complementary to
*  social range of consensus towards development  *  drive for competitiveness  low transactions  competitive private sector
*  constituency in non-oil traded sectors  costs  *  active exchange rate management to
*  insulated technocracy  . strong constituency  for stabilization and  limit Dutch disease
fiscal restraint
Predatory Autocracy  *  short horizon  *  no savings
*  unstable government,  legitimized by military force of  *  policy instability, nontransparency  *  highly procyclical expenditure
amis  *  low competitiveness,  high transactions  costs  *  very high government consumption, rent
*  lack of consensus building mechanisms  *  spending interests strong vis-a-vis private sector  absorption by elites through petty corruption
*  bureaucracy exists as mechanism of rent capture and  or pro-stabilization  interests  and patronage,  capital flight
distribution; corrupt judicial system
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